61 - Nobody’s Perfect: the Stoics on Knowledge
The Stoics think there could be a perfect sage, so wise that he is never wrong. Is this a big mistake? Peter investigates their epistemology to find out.
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• J.E. Annas, “Stoic Epistemology,” and G. Striker, “The Problem of the Criterion,” in S. Everson, Epistemology (Cambridge: 1990).
• S. Bobzien, “Chrysippus and the Epistemic Theory of Vagueness,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (2002), 217-238.
• M. Frede, “The Stoic Notion of a Lekton,” in S. Everson, Language (Cambridge: 1994), 109-28.
• M. Frede, “Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions,” in Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Oxford: 1987), 151-78.
• M. Mignucci, “The Liar Paradox and the Stoics,” in K. Ierodiakonou (ed.), Topics in Stoic Philosophy (Oxford: 1999), 54-70.
• F.H. Sandbach, “Phantasia Kataleptike,” in A.A. Long, Problems in Stoicism (London: 1971).