Hey,
As the local Unreconstructed Incompatibilist, I have to ask if Epictetus agreed with the classic Stoic position about all decisions being predetermined and unchangeable? If so, was he not aware of a hint of irony, in making our ability to chose the highest good? I pricked up my ears when you described the character who realised that the whole of his life up to then did NOT determine his next move - but then that was Satre, not Epictetus.
I also have a question about this idea of most-everything - like health and wealth and beauty - having "no value" in themselves. I gather, for the Stoics, what this actually means is: "The wise man trains himself to hold these things as valueless, so that he will not be disturbed if he loses them". Is that right? Bc, if so, I don't see why the wise man should not, instead, train himself to appreciate the value of such things, while also holding himself ready to live without them. I mean, it's good to have a nourishing meal today, even if (especially if?) you're likely to go hungry tomorrow.
I wondered if the "all things are valueless" axiom maybe had some resemblance to the Buddhist idea of all things being illusions? Not that I'm thinking the Stoics were aware of the Buddhists (I'm not even sure of the relative chronology). But I wondered if the central insistence on things being valueless, has to do with some understanding of the physical universe as not-as-real as the psychic universe (if you understand what I mean).
Free will for Epictetis
Hey,
As the local Unreconstructed Incompatibilist, I have to ask if Epictetus agreed with the classic Stoic position about all decisions being predetermined and unchangeable? If so, was he not aware of a hint of irony, in making our ability to chose the highest good? I pricked up my ears when you described the character who realised that the whole of his life up to then did NOT determine his next move - but then that was Satre, not Epictetus.
I also have a question about this idea of most-everything - like health and wealth and beauty - having "no value" in themselves. I gather, for the Stoics, what this actually means is: "The wise man trains himself to hold these things as valueless, so that he will not be disturbed if he loses them". Is that right? Bc, if so, I don't see why the wise man should not, instead, train himself to appreciate the value of such things, while also holding himself ready to live without them. I mean, it's good to have a nourishing meal today, even if (especially if?) you're likely to go hungry tomorrow.
I wondered if the "all things are valueless" axiom maybe had some resemblance to the Buddhist idea of all things being illusions? Not that I'm thinking the Stoics were aware of the Buddhists (I'm not even sure of the relative chronology). But I wondered if the central insistence on things being valueless, has to do with some understanding of the physical universe as not-as-real as the psychic universe (if you understand what I mean).
Marissa