Bonus Episode: Don't Think for Yourself, Chapter 1

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Peter reads the first chapter of his new book Don’t Think for Yourself: Authority and Belief in Medieval Philosophy, available from University of Notre Dame Press. Pre-order with the code 14FF20 from undpress.nd.edu, to get a 20% discount!

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Comments

G. Tarun on 22 September 2024

Leo Strauss's theologico-political problem

Hi Dr. Adamson, Can you add this episode to the Religion and Reason theme as well? I think it fits there perfectly, given that in terms of thinkers it draws on many of the medieval Islamic world philosophers.

I was wondering if justified taqlid can be seen as a response to Leo Strauss's theologico-political problem (revelation vs reason).

In reply to by G. Tarun

Peter Adamson on 23 September 2024

Justified taqlid

Oh that’s an interesting point - I have not integrated the bonus episodes into the “Themes” at all I think, but maybe I should to make it easier for people to find them.

As for Strauss, I think of justified taqlid basically as a rationalist move since revelation is used as a source on rational grounds.

In reply to by Peter Adamson

Tarun G on 26 September 2024

Religion and reason

I'm not sure about other bonus episodes, but interestingly this episode shows up on the Epistemology theme page! So I think it'd be a great addition to Religion and Reason too. And most of the other bonus episodes too, of course, do make sense in the themes. I'm assuming these too can be displayed chronologically - and I think it'll make the theme pages even more useful as one-stop shops for all episodes on an area.

Thanks too for clarifying the bit on justified taqlīd. 

In reply to by Tarun G

Peter Adamson on 27 September 2024

Themes

Ah ok, so I may have been inconsistent about that. I am about to put up ten (!) more bonus episodes on connections between German and global philosophy, so that will be a good chance to do this systematically.

In reply to by Peter Adamson

G. Tarun on 26 March 2025

Strauss

Revisiting after Strauss's Jerusalem and Athens lectures, and Ch. 3 of your book! I'm fascinated by how the thinkers you discuss do recognise that justified taqlid isn't a faith in one's epistemic authority as absolutely unerring. In other words: I don't assume my professor is omniscient (in their field), or that my doctor is infallibly right. BUT I know enough (for instance, about the effort, training, and acquired expertise and built-up experience) to judge that this is an epistemic authority I can trust, because their likelihood of being right trumps that of being wrong. And the epistemic authority can, of course, be another person, or a text -- very broadly a 'signal' or 'sign', to borrow Stuart Hall's term from the Encoding-Decoding essay (discussed in Africana philosophy!)

Do you see this connecting to pragmatist and Bayesian positions - even if these were formulated much later?

Also, justified taqlid does seem to imply that the Athenian can recognise the value of thinking like a Jerusalemite - using reason to acknowledge the value of trusting revelation when justified. Does it also imply that the Jerusalemite can also reason -- or if they do, are they making a rationalist move? (By 'Athenian' and 'Jerusalemite' I'm NOT referring to actual citizens from these cities. Using them as metaphors rather for an adherent of taqlid/revelation and ijtihad/reason instead!) 

In reply to by G. Tarun

Peter Adamson on 27 March 2025

Jerusalemite

Yes I think pragmatism is a good fit for the idea, and also Bayesianism, which could give us a technical model for the procedure, because you revise your assessment of the apparent expertise of the authority as you go along - and it would be a good addition to the whole theory to think about it in terms of probabilities rather than just on/off credence (like, because the authority tells me X, I put a higher probability on X being true).

The Jerusalemite or muqallid (person who uses taqlid) can and does definitely reason too, in at least two ways: first, they can use reason to justify accepting an authority. This is typical in Islamic theology: they give rational (i.e. "convincing to anyone," in intent at least) arguments that Muhammad was a genuine prophet. Second, they can reason "within taqlid", like, take certain principles as given and then do further reasoning on that basis. This is Aquinas' position on how theology works actually. 

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